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Summary 
The late 2000s-recession caused massive damage to the global economy. High 
unemployment, low consumer confidence, declining asset prices and national debt crises were 
but a few hardships that countries worldwide had to sustain. In terms of unemployment Japan, 
Germany, and the United States - three of the world’s biggest economies – were affected very 
differently. A look at unemployment levels reveal striking differences. In Germany, 
unemployment had for much of the 2000s endured levels far above eight percent, and at times 
close to twelve percent. When crisis hit in late 2007, however, unemployment remained 
remarkably low and remarkably stable, even dropping to seven percent at one point. 
Unemployment in the United States, on the other hand, had experienced a steady decline 
following the early 2000s-recession from six to four percent. When the crisis hit, the 
American labor market saw a precipitous rise in unemployment, which peaked at above 
twelve percent in late 2009. Japan, like the U.S., experienced a steady decline in 
unemployment leading up to the crisis. But unlike the U.S., Japan was able to keep its 
unemployment level below six percent when the crisis hit, despite a one percent rise.  
My paper discusses the reasons for these different unemployment responses in the respective 
countries. Despite the economic grandeur these countries share, their labor markets are quite 
distinct from one another. Because of their different characteristics, economic downturns have 
different effects on unemployment. My investigation suggests that the observed responses can 
largely, although not exclusively, be explained by existing labor market characteristics. In 
short, the reason why the United States suffered a sharp rise in unemployment is that labor 
adjustment was about the only tool that American employers had (and have) at their disposal 
to deal with the crisis. Japanese and German employers, as my discussion suggests, were able 
to exploit other channels. Japanese and German labor markets could to a greater degree 
handle declining demand through transfers and wage and hour adjustments before resorting to 
layoffs. Furthermore, the governments of Japan and Germany engaged in massive work-share 
programs in order to prevent mass-layoffs. The American work-share effort, in contrast, was 
rather limited and ill-suited. In sum, Japan and Germany had more outlets available to relieve 
the labor market pressure caused by the crisis.  
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1.0 Introduction 
The aim of this paper is to discuss the main factors behind the unique responses in 
(un)employment in the respective countries’ labor markets. Schmitt (2011) lists three possible 
reasons for different experiences. The first is that the size of the shock may differ across 
countries. Since such shocks cannot be directly observed, one can never be sure. The second 
reason are different macroeconomic policy responses, which also vary across countries. 
Lastly, the structure of labor markets plays a role. Aside from the acknowledgement that 
shocks cannot be directly observed, uniqueness in labor market responses must necessarily 
stem from differences in fundamental characteristics of and policies implemented in these 
labor markets. A vast array of different characteristics can be detected, and these differences 
in turn help explain how the crisis impacted on the labor markets. My paper emphasizes the 
following: The empirical relationship between changes in output and changes in 
unemployment – also known as Okun’s Law, wage flexibility/moderation, employment 
protection legislation, crisis-induced work-sharing programs, and lastly institutional and 
cultural characteristics across countries. My analysis combines regression analyses, formal-
modeling methods, and qualitative investigation. 
The analysis starts out in chapter 2 with Okun’s law in, which describes the relationship 
between output and unemployment. This law is empirically found to be a negative 
relationship between the two. The relationship runs both ways. Changes in unemployment 
induce changes in output, or conversely, changes in output induce changes in unemployment. 
The elasticity of one variable with respect to another will tell us how sensitive the market is. 
The analysis in this chapter is carried out using Stata®. The ensuing chapters will in turn 
explore the institutional factors behind the elasticity.  
 
Chapter 3 deals with wage flexibility. If wages are flexible, firms can cut wages instead of 
firing workers in the event of a downturn, and job loss can be mitigated. There are important 
differences in how wages are determined in the respective countries. While my analysis 
suggests that Japanese and German wages are more flexible than wages in the United States, 
other empirical results are conflicting. 
 
The topic of discussion in chapter 4 is employment protection legislation (EPL). The ease 
with which firms can adjust their employment level is determined by law. The stricter EPL is, 
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the higher the firing costs incurred by the firm. Research on the matter not only highlights the 
relevance of differences in EPL strictness across countries and time, but also differences in 
strictness between temporary and permanent contracts. Over time EPL strictness has 
weakened considerably for temporary workers. Consequently, the share of temporary labor in 
the work force has gradually increased. Since temporary workers do not enjoy the same level 
of protection as permanent workers, unemployment is expected to respond more sensitively to 
shocks. Countries with lenient EPL would be expected to experience greater unemployment 
responses than countries where protection is higher, all else equal. A large share of temporary 
workers in the workforce pulls in the same direction as low levels of protection. This chapter 
discusses whether the labor market responses are consistent with the observed protection 
levels and the work force compositions in the respective countries. 
 
Chapter 5 discusses the usage of government-induces short-time work programs. The severity 
of the Great Recession induced national governments to implement extraordinary policies to 
evade mass-unemployment. Differences in design, coverage, and participation criteria 
resulted in more extensive use in Japan and Germany than in the US.  
 
Chapter 6 discusses the relevance of cultural characteristics and their roots in shaping the 
labor markets. Through a dive into the sociological realm, I will attempt to give reasons for 
the labor market differences highlighted in preceding chapters. In this context, the 
institutional configurations of the economies are endogenous; these are in turn conditioned by 
external factors, namely cultural characteristics. A lot of labor market literature puts very little 
emphasis cultural characteristics in explaining different institutional features. Conversely, 
when it does analyze cultural characteristics, it typically does not link it to labor market 
behavior. This chapter will try to bridge this gap by showing how different interpersonal 
relationships can affect labor market behavior. Distinct characteristics of the respective labor 
markets help explain why German and Japanese employers enjoyed greater flexibility, 
whereas US employers had fewer options available. The final chapter summarizes and 
concludes. 
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2.0 A Closer Look Into Okun’s Law 
The relationship between output growth and the change in unemployment, Okun’s Law, is a 
widely accepted empirical regularity. It was first characterized and interpreted by economist 
Arthur Okun (Blanchard, 2006). It predicts a negative relationship between changes in output 
and changes in unemployment, or conversely, between changes in the unemployment rate and 
changes in output. Formally the relationship can take a variety of forms. An example of a 
simple form could be the following: 
 
                                                     
 
or conversely, 
 
                                                          
 
 In the former equation α is an intercept coefficient, and β is the elasticity of output growth 
with respect to changes in unemployment. In the latter model α is the intercept coefficient, 
and   is the elasticity of the unemployment rate with respect to output.  
2.1 An Empirical Approach 
In its simplest form the Law appears as a two-variable function, as shown above. 
Commentators point to its insufficiency precisely because of its simplicity. In its original form 
the Law fails to take into account other important factors, such as lagged terms. Thus, the 
Law appears in many variants, and different authors use different specifications. 
Consequently, their conclusions on the impact of falling GDP on unemployment, or vice-
versa, tend to differ. I will in the following use the specification put forth by Steinberg & 
Nakane (2011), to estimate the relationship between unemployment and output. 
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 (2.1) 
   is the change in the unemployment rate, and    is the change in output. Since firms may 
take some time to adjust its labor input, the estimation allows for lagged effects. The 
immediate effect of an output drop may not be very strong – unemployment may not even rise. 
A possible explanation is that firms are still providing goods and services from pending orders. 
However, as the economy finds itself in distress over a longer period, demand will diminish, 
and firms start adjusting their labor input. Hence,    is expected to be negative. According to 
this model do not only present and past changes in output have an effect on present changes in 
unemployment, but also past changes in unemployment. In major industrialized countries it is 
reasonable to believe that unemployment oscillates around a natural level. So any change in 
unemployment in a given period is expected to be reversed in later periods. I have run 
ordinary least squares (OLS) regressions with the above specification for the three countries, 
and reached the following estimates
1
: 
Table 1: Regression Results, Model (2.1) 
                    
  
Japan Coefficient .0243668    -.0085706    -.0204748       -.2080493    -.1536245    -.1236923     0.1309 
 S.E. .0083034      .0083931     .0083952 .1198795     .1197487    .118323     
 t-statistic 2.93 -1.02 -2.44 -1.74 -1.28 -1.05  
USA Coefficient .0796797   -.0558652       -.0461674    -.4483932   -.099769        -.4232828    0.5382 
 S.E. .0176264      .0173836 .0188242     .1094934     .1063323 .0978384      
 t-statistic 4.52 -3.21 -2.45 -4.10 -0.94 -4.33  
Germany Coefficient .0331724    -.0229152    -.0195138    -.3105832       -.0837839    -.3729398        0.2806 
 S.E. .0112952      .0135636     .0133727    .1162582 .1198668    .1159288  
 t-statistic 2.94 -1.69 -1.46 -2.67 -0.70 -3.22  
 
                                                 
1
 Data are collected from the OECD statistical database. Estimates are based on quarterly data in the period 
1990Q1-2007Q4. 
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Next, I introduce a dummy variable    that takes the value 1 if the economy is in a state if 
recession, and 0 otherwise
2
. In order to account for possible interaction effects the original 
specification in (2.1) now looks like the following: 
 
                                                           
                                                
 (2.2) 
In the case of recession, we have that: 
                                                      
                             
(2.3) 
and the specification will look like (2.1) otherwise. The results are reported in table 2: 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
2
 The economy is considered to be in a recession if the GDP contracts for two consecutive quarters or longer. 
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Table 2: Regression Results, Model (2.2) 
                        
  
Japan Coefficient .01407  .0100927    .0012311   -.0413406   -.0172738 -.018952 0.2273 
 S.E. .0106246 .0711052     .0104218     .0557717     .0096435 .0236434  
 t-statistic 1.32 0.14 0.12 -0.74 -1.79 -0.80  
                           
  
 Coefficient -.2379139 .0975071 -.0723095 -.9030197 -.0690334 .0381093 0.0832 
 S.E. .1254864 .5931212 .1239875 .51942 .1241646 .4775186  
 t-statistic -1.90 0.16 -0.58 -1.74 -0.56 0.08  
                        
  
USA Coefficient .0576761 .034913 -.0417858 -.0573859 -.0361842 -.0121153  0.5692 
 S.E. .0231667 .0445015 .0207792  .0704434  .0204017 .0647906  
 t-statistic 2.49 0.78 -2.01 -0.81 -1.77 -0.19  
                           
  
 Coefficient -.4358789  -   -.0953168 -.2379477 -.3822687 -.6950326 0.4950 
 S.E. .1135116  - .1118707 .4162641 .1015974  .4918653  
 t-statistic -3.84 - -0.85 -0.57 -3.76 -1.41  
Germany                        
  
 Coefficient .0236817 .1549986 -.012925 .2248848   -.0167758    .1481421 0.3319 
 S.E. .0139592 .1526157  .0157609 .3178313 .0163477 .1489639   
 t-statistic 1.70 1.02 -0.82   0.71 -1.03 0.99  
                           
  
 Coefficient -.290525   -.1574238 -.0576923  -.0889439 -.3196363 -1.68376 0.1958 
 S.E. .1339816 .41789 .129017 .424862 .1245276  1.487807  
 t-statistic -2.17 -0.38 -0.45 -0.21 -2.57 -1.13  
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2.2 Comments on the Results 
2.2.1 Japan 
Specification (2.1): The estimation shows a negative relationship between changes in 
unemployment and changes in output growth. The elasticity of current unemployment with 
respect to changes in both current and lagged output is negative, but only  
   is statistically significant. This suggests that unemployment does not react immediately to 
output changes. Further, the estimation shows a negative relationship between changes in 
unemployment and past changes in unemployment. The intuition behind this result might be 
the following: Japanese unemployment has generally stayed low the last twenty years 
(averaging 3.9 percent), never exceeding 5.5 percent (not even during the Great Recession), 
and remained close to 2 percent in the first half of the 1990s. Unemployment changes will be 
reversed in later periods. The regression results show, however, that no single lagged 
dependent variable is statistically significant. Furthermore, the proportion of variation in the 
dependent variable that is explained by the model is low. 
Specification (2.2): The model fares even worse when it is extended. No single variable is 
statistically significant at the 95% significance level. This may result from the generally low 
volatility of Japanese unemployment. If we allow for a 90% significance level   ,   , and      
become significant. In any event, the model seems ill-suited to explain unemployment 
changes in Japan. 
2.2.2 The United States 
Specification (2.1): Here, as in the case of Japan, the estimation again shows a negative 
relationship between unemployment and output changes, and between current and earlier 
unemployment changes. All but one variable are statistically significant. The estimation also 
shows that current unemployment almost exclusively reacts more sensitively with respect to 
output changes and previous unemployment changes in the United States than in Japan and 
Germany.  
Specification (2.2):  With the extended model current output changes have a significant effect 
at the 95% significance level, while lagged output has a significant effect at the 90% 
significance level. Out of the lagged dependent variables, unemployment lagged two quarters 
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is still the only insignificant one. Changes in unemployment are the most sensitive with 
respect to the right-hand-side variables in this specification as well. No single dummy 
variable is statistically significant. 
2.2.3 Germany 
Specification (2.1): The negative relationship between current unemployment changes and 
output changes, and between current unemployment and earlier unemployment changes, 
remains. The initial assumptions seem vindicated. Unemployment reacts significantly with 
respect to current output changes at the 90% significance level, and with respect 
unemployment changes lagged one and three periods at the 95% significance level.  
Specification (2.2): The model fares poorly when the model is extended. The only significant 
variable (at the 95% significance level) is unemployment lagged one period. The dummy 
effect was not significant in any of the three cases. 
2.2.4 The Long-Run Impact 
If we assume a long-run equilibrium where  
                          
and 
                
then (2.1) reads:  
                              
which gives the long/run impact 
    
 
             
 
     
             
    
(2.5) 
 
 (2.4) 
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Following the same procedure, the long-run impact of a recession becomes: 
  
    
        ⏞     
   
  {        ⏟
   
         ⏟
   
         ⏟
   
}
 
        ⏞     
   
         ⏞     
   
  {        ⏟
   
         ⏟
   
         ⏟
   
}
  
  
   
                
 
       
                
   
(2.6) 
 
Based on the above estimations, a 1% decrease in output yields the following changes in 
unemployment for the respective countries: 
Table 3: The Long-Run Impact on    
       spec (2.1)    spec (2.2) 
Japan  -1% 0.0195544% 0.0462058% 
USA  -1% 0.0517552% 0.0518222% 
Germany -1% 0.0240077% -0.0534588% 
 
The estimates for specification (2.1) show that the US is the country where unemployment 
reacts the strongest to changes in output, and that unemployment responds weakest in Japan. 
According to the estimates, unemployment increases by more than double that of Japan and 
Germany. Blanchard (2006) holds that these results are consistent with firm behavior and 
employment relations across countries. His general argument is the following: Japanese firms 
offer a high degree of job security to their workers, so output variations have little effect on 
unemployment. Therefore it comes as no surprise that Japan experiences the smallest change 
in unemployment. The largest elasticity is found in the United States, which should not come 
as a surprise either. American firms face fewer constrains on their employment adjustment 
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behavior. This leaves Germany in between Japan and the US. Again, this is to be expected 
because of legal restrictions on firing - from severance pay and the need for permission from 
the state to terminate employment. This is, as we will see, consistent with the findings in 
subsequent chapters. The results in specification (2.2) are somewhat surprising. While the U.S. 
exhibits slightly higher elasticity compared to Japan, the unemployment change induced by a 
fall in output is negative in Germany. This stands at odds with the initial assumptions, and 
also with the results obtained from specification (2.1). Steinberg & Nakane (2011), using 
regression analysis, find that the long-term elasticity is the lowest in Japan at slightly below 
0.1. Germany and the U.S. exhibit about the same elasticity with respect to output at about 0.4. 
2.2.5 Testing the Estimates 
Comparing actual data to the estimates gives the following developments in the respective 
countries: 
Figure 1: Testing the Estimates for Japan, Germany, and the United States 
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In the case of Japan, both models capture the moves in unemployment fairly well between 
2008q1 and the beginning of 2008q3, and from 2009q3 on. In between these periods they 
largely predict the direction of change correctly, but they are both somewhat imprecise. 
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Model (2.1) for Germany captures the movements of unemployment well overall, although 
with some imprecision. Model (2.2) fails miserably between 2008 and the beginning of the 
second quarter of 2009, both in terms of direction and precision. Coming out of the recession 
the model catches up with actual unemployment and follows the movements correctly, and 
the estimates lie closer to the actual data. In the United States both models correctly predict 
the sign of the changes overall. The estimates are imprecise between the end of 2008 and the 
beginning of 2009. Generally the models capture the movements of unemployment change 
well for all three countries (except for specification (2.2) in the case of Germany), but they all 
lack precision particularly in the 2008q3-2010q1 span. Clearly, there are crisis-related factors 
that the models do not take into account. The full effects of the worst slump since the Great 
Depression were not sufficiently identified.  
Unemployment does not only vary across countries; it also varies over time. Over time 
unemployment has become more responsive to output changes. These changes are also in 
accordance with firm behavior and regulations. Job security has diminished as a result of 
increased competition in goods markets since the early 1980s. Furthermore, firing restrictions 
have been considerably weakened as a result of firms’ urging ( (International Monetary Fund, 
2010) The argumentation above is just something to give a general picture of the countries’ 
labor markets. The next chapter will deal with the role of wages, and later I will in detail look 
into the structure of the labor markets and employment relations.  
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3.0 Wage Theory 
The preceding chapter showed how changes in output were reflected in changes in 
unemployment, and demonstrated how sensitivity differs from country to country. However, 
that is all it does. As to explanations why the elasticity differs, the model comes up short. The 
next chapters will attempt to explain these differences. Wage flexibility and wage moderation 
are seen by researchers as important in mitigating labor market effects in the event of a 
downturn. Japan in particular is highlighted as a country with a very flexible wage setting 
regime. When the crisis hit Japanese employers were able to utilize this flexibility to cut 
wages instead of workers. Germany on the other hand is credited for its wage moderation 
prior to the crisis. German wage moderation was increasing demand for labor, and thus 
pushing German employment to a higher equilibrium. This upward transition mitigated the 
negative employment response to the crisis. Conversely, because of lack of such wage 
flexibility in American wages, employers shed workers instead of wages. The following starts 
out by giving wage flexibility/rigidity a theoretical framework. Later I will use this 
framework to explain the respective wage/unemployment responses. 
The starting point for explaining wage flexibility theory is a fall in labor demand caused by 
reduced goods demand. Along the vertical axis we have wages, and along the horizontal axis 
employment. Labor supply is an increasing function of the wage rate. The higher the wage 
offered by the employer, the higher the labor supplied by the employee. Labor demand is a 
falling function of wages. The lower the going wage rate, the more labor is demanded. Figure 
1 shows what happens when a negative demand shock (or a disequilibrium) for labor occurs. 
Reduced labor demand shifts the demand curve leftward. Assuming that labor supply remains 
constant, labor reduces from    to   , and wages fall from    to   . One has to keep in 
mind that the slope of the demand and supply curves will affect the impact on wages and 
labor. In figure 1 the disequilibrium is absorbed partly by reduced wages and partly by 
reduced labor utilization. In the following we will see one case in which wages are perfectly 
elastic and another in which they are perfectly rigid. 
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Figure 2: Wages and Labor Input – the General Case 
. 
Figure 3: Wages and Labor Input – Flexible Wage Regime 
Source: Goubert & Omey (1996)  
Source: Goubert & Omey (1996)  
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Figure 3 displays the case in which wages are perfectly flexible. Workers supply labor L at 
any wage rate offered by employers. As before, a negative demand shock causes the demand 
curve to shift leftward. There will be no response in labor utilization. L remains the utilized 
amount of labor. Wages, on the other hand, respond to the negative demand shock by falling 
from    to   . The entire shock is absorbed by reduced wages. 
 
Figure 4: Wages and Labor Input – Rigid Wage Regime 
 
Source: Goubert & Omey (1996)  
 
Figure 4 shows the perfectly rigid wages case. At wage rate w labor is supplied by an infinite 
amount. As before the negative demand shock shifts the demand curve leftwards. Now the 
response is seen in lower labor utilization. Labor falls from    to   . But since wages are 
perfectly rigid, there is no wage response to reduced labor demand. The shock is reflected by 
an increase in unemployment. 
Faced with a sharp drop in output, firms can cut labor costs through the following actions: 
- They can shed workers. If for instance annual wages are rigid, then keeping the 
workers might prove unsustainable, and the firm might be left with no other option 
16 
 
than to let workers go. This situation corresponds to figure 3, where wages stay 
constant but where labor utilization falls. 
- They can reduce wages. This situation is described by figure 2. Employment can be 
kept constant if wages are allowed to fall. 
- They can reduce the amount of hours worked. Even if hourly earnings are rigid, 
employers and employees can agree upon reduced work weeks to maintain 
employment while at the same running a viable business. Wages (hourly) remain the 
same, as does employment, but total labor utilization has fallen. This case falls 
between two stools, as neither figure 2 or 3 is able to perfectly describe it. Labor is 
maintained at a constant level, but labor utilization has fallen. This is a case not of 
wage flexibility, but of employment flexibility. If instead the horizontal axis shows 
labor utilization, figure 2 appropriately describes this situation. This section will 
concentrate on wage flexibility. Employment flexibility in terms of reduced hours is 
treated in the section on work-sharing. 
 
The above framework views the wage response to labor demand shocks. The degree of 
flexibility determines how much wages and/or employment will fall in response to a negative 
labor demand shock. However, in this framework no relationship between wages and 
employment is established. The shock is caused by some outside factor (like a negative 
demand shock for goods). On the response side wages and employment act as substitutes, and 
the final adjustment is determined by degree of wage flexibility. A look at figures 2 and 3 will 
help clarify. In figure 2, perfect flexibility is assumed. The negative demand shock is fully 
absorbed by a wage reduction, and no change in unemployment occurs. Thus, although there 
is a relationship between the shock and the wage rate, no relationship between wage change 
and unemployment can be observed. For a highly flexible regime, even small differences in 
relative wage changes will give large differences in the wage change/unemployment ratio. In 
figure 3 wages are perfectly rigid. If we assume perfectly rigid wages, there is no reaction of 
wages to the decline of labor demand. The entire shock shows up through increased 
unemployment. Again, though there is a relationship between the shock and unemployment, 
no relationship between wages and unemployment can be discerned (Goubert & Omey, 1996). 
This absence of any causal relationship between wages and unemployment, as presented 
above, is contested by some. On the one hand, wage rigidity is put forward as one of the main 
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causes of unemployment. An alternative proposition is that high unemployment is associated 
high wage flexibility. The argument is that higher levels of unemployment drive down the 
wages of the low-paid. Calistri and Galbraith (2001) find a positive correlation between 
unemployment and wage flexibility for a number of countries, including Japan and Germany. 
The US is the only country which exhibits a negative correlation. The discussion shows that 
even among economic authors there does not seem to exist a unanimous consensus on the 
measurement or the determinants of wage flexibility, or even which way causality runs. 
3.1 The Determinants of Wages 
Despite, or perhaps because of the debate the above discussion creates, a standard 
undergraduate text will be used to expresses wage determination in the following simple 
manner (Blanchard 2006): 
 
           
 
The nominal wage  depends on: 
- The expected price level     The higher the expected price level, the higher the 
desired wage level. 
- The unemployment level    The higher the unemployment rate, the weaker the 
workers’ position in bargaining, and the lower the wage. 
- A catchall variable   that captures all other variables that may affect the wage setting 
outcome. 
  
The   variable in the above equation contains a lot of important factors that contribute to the 
determination of wages. More complicated versions of Blanchard’s model take into account a 
variety of factors that help explain wage responses. The following equation
3
 will elaborate on 
Blanchard’s model (See Heylen (1992) for a complete discussion). 
                                                 
3
 The wage equation used by Heylen (1992) is much more extensive than  (3.1). His takes into account many 
more explanatory factors to explain wage flexibility. For the full model, please consult his work. There are 
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(3.1) 
        
All variables are expressed in logs. Here     
  is the price expected to prevail in the next 
period. Workers are interested in how much they can consume with their earnings. Hence, 
they are interested in the nominal wage relative to the prices of the goods they buy. Similarly, 
firms care about the wage payments relative to the prices of the goods that they sell. In other 
words, the real wage is what we care about.          is the real wage in the previous 
period. Wage determination is based in part on what the real wage was in the previous period. 
   is labor productivity. Workers want their real wages to reflect their productivity.   
measures the persistence of the real wage (      . Hence the nominal wage set for the 
current period depends positively on prior real wage and productivity growth. Lastly,   is the 
unemployment coefficient (on   , not to be confused with  ), and takes on a negative value. 
The argument is that a marginal increase in unemployment will cause a fall in wages.    in 
turn depends positively on   and  .   denotes the degree of centralization of wage bargaining. 
  denotes the degree of coordination of wage bargaining. The next section will assess the 
effects of the institutional configuration, i.e. wage bargaining, on the elasticity of wages with 
respect to unemployment.  
3.1.1 Wage Bargaining and the Unemployment Coefficient 
In the wage equation above the unemployment coefficient depends on two characteristics of 
wage bargaining: centralization and coordination. The distinction between the two is subtle. If 
wage bargaining is highly centralized, the agreements are reached on a central level and carry 
overriding importance. When agreements are reached on company and plant level, then 
bargaining is decentralized. Agreements can be decentralized and at the same time highly 
(implicitly) coordinated. It would be as if agreements were centralized. On the other hand, if 
wage bargaining is centralized, coordination follows implicitly. This is because the 
agreements reached already apply on a central level (Boeri & van Ours, 2008).  
                                                                                                                                                        
obviously a great number of factors that help explain wage flexibility. Heylen’s model has been simplified and 
modified in order to highlight the contribution of centralization and coordination. 
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In centralized labor markets wage responsiveness to unemployment is higher than in 
decentralized markets. This is because centralized unions to a greater extent prioritize 
employment to wages. Centralized unions to a greater extent attempt to reach the dual goal of 
not only favorable wages, but also of employment to all workers. For labor markets where 
wage bargaining is centralized   will take on a higher value, increasing wage flexibility of 
unemployment. For less centralized bargaining, on industry or firm level, unions no longer 
have the incentive to moderate wages for the sake of employment. This drives down  . On the 
other hand, substitutability between products of different firms leads to high elasticity of labor 
demand. Thus, excessive wage claims may result in job loss. This will pull the   up. On 
industry level product substitutability is smaller than on firm level, so the positive effect on   
is also smaller. Thus, we can view the relationship between wage flexibility and centralization 
as a U-shaped curve (Heylen, 1993). 
Wage flexibility also depends positively on γ, the degree of coordination in wage bargaining. 
The greater the degree of coordination, the greater the γ is, and the greater the flexibility. 
Because different countries have different bargaining systems   and γ will vary across 
countries, depending on their degree of centralization and coordination.  Boeri and van Ours 
Figure 5: Wage Flexibility and the Degree of Centralization 
Source: Heylen (1992)  
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(2008) have indexed the degree of centralization and coordination for a number of countries. 
The scores for Germany and the United States are reported below. 
The classification ranges from 1 to 5, where higher values indicate higher levels of 
centralization and coordination. The coding can thus be viewed as an indicator of the 
structural characteristics of the wage bargaining process. The indices are categorized as 
follows
4
: 
 Centralization 
1 Company and plant level pre dominant. 
2 Combination of industry and company/plant level, with an important share of employees covered by company bargains. 
3 Industry level predominant. 
4 Predominantly industrial bargaining, but also recurrent central-level agreements. 
5 Central-level agreements of overriding importance. 
  
 Coordination 
1 Fragmented company/plant bargaining, little or no coordination by upper-level associations. 
2 Fragmented industry- and company-level bargaining, with little or no pattern setting. 
3 Industry-level bargaining with irregular pattern setting and moderate coordination among major bargaining actors. 
4 a) Informal coordination of  industrial and firm-level bargaining by (multiple) peak associations. 
 b) Coordinated bargaining by peak confederations, including government-sponsored negotiations (tripartite 
agreements, social pacts), or  government imposition of wage schedules 
 c) Regular pattern setting coupled by high union concentration and/or bargaining coordination by large firms. 
 d) Government wage arbitration. 
5 a) Informal coordination of industry-level bargaining by an encompassing union confederation  
 b) Coordinated bargaining by peak confederations or government imposition of a wage schedule/freeze, with a 
peace obligation. 
 
Table 4: Degrees of Centralization and Coordination (Boeri & van Ours, 2008) 
 Centralization Coordination 
Germany 3 4 
USA 1 1 
 
Kenworthy (2001) scores the degree of coordination for the Japan, Germany, and the United 
States as follows: 
  
                                                 
4
 Index descriptions are as presented in Boeri & van Ours  (2008). 
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Table 5: Degrees of Coordination (Kenworthy, 2001) 
 Time Span Coordination 
Japan 1960-2000 5 
Germany 1974-2000 4 
USA 1960-2000 1 
 
The index is similar to that of Tito and Boeri, with five different categories. Higher values 
denote a higher degree of coordination
5
. Kenworthy does not, however, score the degree of 
centralization. Nevertheless, as argued above, a high degree of coordination can occur without 
a high degree of centralization. As a result, a high level of coordination could act as a 
substitute for high centralization to the extent that centrally reached agreements carry 
overriding importance. 
1 Fragmented wage bargaining confined largely to individual firms or plants. 
2 Mixed industry- and firm-level bargaining, with little or no pattern-setting and relatively weak elements of government 
of government coordination such as setting of basic pay rate or wage indexation. 
3 Industry-level bargaining with somewhat irregular and uncertain pattern-setting and only moderate union concentration. 
Government wage arbitration. 
4 Centralized bargaining by peak confederation(s) or government imposition of a wage schedule/freeze, without a peace 
obligation. 
Informal centralization of industry- and firm-level bargaining by peak associations. 
Extensive, regularized pattern-setting coupled with a high degree of union concentration. 
5 Centralized bargaining by peak confederation (s) or government imposition of a wage schedule/freeze, with a peace 
obligation. 
Informal centralization of industry-level bargaining by a powerful, monopolistic union confederation. 
Extensive, regularized pattern-setting and highly synchronized bargaining coupled with coordination of bargaining by 
influential large firms. 
 
3.2 Centralization, Coordination, and the Aggregate 
Effect on the Unemployment Coefficient in the 
Respective Countries  
Based on the categorization in the previous subsection, I will attempt to assess the degree of 
wage flexibility with respect to unemployment in the three countries. 
  
                                                 
5
 Index descriptions are as presented in Kenworthy (2001). The reason for giving the index descriptions in their 
entirety is that the scores might have differed depending on the categorizations.  
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3.2.2 Japan 
Although Japan is not included in Tito and Boeri’s list of indexed countries, the fact that most 
collective bargaining in Japan is conducted at the plant level between an enterprise union and 
management (Shirai, 1984) would give it a centralization score of 1 or 2. All agreements 
reached are between firms and their own unions, but Japanese enterprise unions typically 
federate into sectoral organizations. With the 1989 merger of the country’s four competing 
confederations into one single organization, Rengo, union wage bargaining became in effect 
centralized. Furthermore, wage is determined in the annual bargaining round, the so-called 
Spring Offensive. This facilitates a high degree of informal coordination of bargaining 
(Golden and Wallerstein, 1994 in Kenworthy, 2001). What we have here is in principle a very 
fragmented wage bargaining system, but in effect a very centralized one. So despite a very 
low score on the centralization index, a high score is assigned on the coordination index.  
What are the implications of these characteristics on equation (3.1)? Despite a low degree of 
formal centralization, the high degree informal coordination makes the system effectively 
centralized. This means that to the extent that the degree of centralization and the degree of 
coordination differ, the coordination effect trumps the centralization effect. In the case of 
Japan wage-setting is highly decentralized, implying a high    At the same time wage-setting 
is highly coordinated, implying a high value on γ. The aggregate effect of these two is a high 
unemployment coefficient  . This structure in turn increases wage flexibility. Japan is 
emphasized as an economy with a highly flexible wages. An additional reason why are non-
scheduled wage payments. A large share of bonuses and paid overtime in contracted pay 
enable firms to adjust wages downward in the face of adversity. Such non-scheduled wage 
payments account for an important share of the annual earnings of Japanese workers 
(Hashimoto, 1990). Such a wage composition helps cushion fluctuations in output.  
3.2.3 Germany  
Germany has a single dominant labor federation, the German Confederation of Trade Unions 
(DGB). Bargaining takes place predominantly at the industry level, and exceptionally at the 
firm level. Thus, as far as centralization is concerned the German score is not very high. 
Nevertheless, the DGB encourages other industries to follow the pattern set by IG Metall, the 
large metalworkers union. Furthermore, by law bargaining coverage is extended to nonunion 
firms. IG Metall acts in effect as an encompassing organization on behalf of a large share of 
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the work force. The pattern set by IG Metall is largely followed by other sectors (Kenworthy, 
2001). In other words we have a considerable degree of pattern-setting, which explains a 
higher coordination score than centralization score in Tito and Boeri. The implications that 
the German structure has on wage flexibility is the following: The intermediate level of 
centralization (a 3 score in Tito and Boeri) yields a low   due to the weakened employment 
incentive. Yet, a relatively high degree of coordination yields a high value for γ  implying 
more flexible wages than what the degree of formal centralization would imply. 
3.2.4 The United States  
Much of U.S. bargaining occurs on the firm-level. However, the national unions have 
considerable authority over the bargaining process. The American auto industry is a prime 
example. Bargaining is undertaken by the United Automobile Workers (UAW), which 
formulates the bargaining demands. The UAW picks one of the “big three” – General Motors, 
Ford and Chrysler – auto companies to bargain with first, according to where they expect to 
exercise the greatest influence. The agreement reached with the first company will be used as 
a standard for the other two. Further, there is little reliance on follow-the-leader bargaining (or 
pattern-setting). Lastly, unlike Japan, there are no annual or synchronized bargaining rounds; 
wage-setting is asynchronous (Soskice, 1990 and Lange, Wallerstein, and Golden, 1994 in 
Kenworthy, 2001). Hence, we have low scores on both the centralization and the coordination 
index. A low score on centralization implies, according to the argumentation above, a high 
degree of wage flexibility. This is because of the high substitutability between products. Thus, 
excessive wage demands could be penalized severely through a layoff. Similarly, since 
coordination is low, each firm, enterprise or plant is planning for itself. Little thought is given 
to the general employment level or possible disturbances to official anti-inflationary policy. 
Further, as already mentioned, bargaining rounds are asynchronous. And lastly, U.S. union 
contracts are set for three years ahead. Except for possible cost-of-living increases and pre-
determined rates of annual increases, wages are not re-negotiated before expiration. This puts 
downward pressure on wage flexibility. 
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3.2.5 Other Empirical Work and Alternative Measures of Wage 
Flexibility 
The countries’ structures suggest that Japan is the country with the highest wage flexibility. 
On the opposite end of the flexibility scale we find the United States. In between we have 
Germany. Heylen (1992) has gathered estimates of the unemployment coefficient   from a 
wide range of researchers: 
Table 6: Heylen’s (1992) Compilation 
Authors 
Country GJL
6
 NS
7
 BLN
8
 OECD
9
 AM
10
 AND
11
 KwCh
12
 LNJ
13
 
Germany 0.77 0.36 3.31 0.11 2.12 2.20 0.14 1.01 
Japan 8.09 3.22 41.00 1.87 14.72 2.75 1.66 14.50 
U.S. 0.24 0.11 0.28 0.61 0.91 0.31 0.60 0.94 
 
A notable feature of the above results is that almost without exception Japan comes out as the 
country with the greatest unemployment coefficient, and that the United States has the 
smallest coefficient. This is consistent with the qualitative argumentation made based on 
bargaining structures. Overall Japanese labor markets are characterized by the highest degree 
of flexibility, ceteris paribus, and American labor markets are characterized by the lowest. 
Steinberg & Nakane (2011) have estimated wage flexibility in the following way: 
 
                       
(3.2) 
In the above equation    and    refer to changes in the real wage rate and the level of output 
growth, respectively. This equation decouples the link between unemployment and wage 
                                                 
6
 Grubb, Jackman and Layard (1983: Table 1). 
7
 Newell and Symons (1985: Tables 6c and 6d). 
8
 Bean, Layard and Nickell (1986: Table 3). 
9
 Organisation for Economic Co-Operation and Development (1989: Table 2.6).  
10
 Alogoskoufis and Manning (1988: Table 5). 
11
 Andersen (1989: Table 4). 
12
 Data for the small countries (except Spain): Kawasaki, Hoeller and Poret (1990: Table 2); data for the large 
countries (and Spain): Chan-Lee, Coe and Prywes (1987: Table 6). 
13
 Layard, Nickell and Jackman (1991, chapter 9: Table 7)  
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flexibility. Instead, wage flexibility – or elasticity – is measured with respect to output 
fluctuations and wage rates from previous periods.  
In the long run we have: 
              
and 
    
(3.1) transforms into: 
 
                   
(3.2) 
 and the expression for the long-run impact of an output shock reads: 
     
 
    
 
  
    
    
(3.3) 
This gives us an equation where the long run wage rate is a function of output fluctuations. 
Output shocks alter the demand for labor, and thus cause the labor demand curve to shift. If a 
positive goods demand shock occurs, firms will want to adjust the labor stock upward to keep 
up with increased demand, and the labor demand curve shifts right. In the case of a recession, 
for example, goods demand falls, and firms adjust employment downwards. The labor 
demand curve shifts left.  Steinberg and Nakane present the following estimates for the output 
coefficient 
  
    
: 
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Table 7: Steinberg & Nakane’s (2011) Estimates of the Output Coefficient  
 Output Coefficient Number of Lags/Recession Dummy Inclusion 
Country Year/Quarter Estimate S.E. t-statistic14       Recession 
Dummy 
BIC 
Japan 1985q3 0.220 0.711 0.31 1 3 Yes -505.41 
 1991q1 1.885 0.972 1.94 0 3 Yes -545.59 
 1997q2 0.242 0.088 2.75 0 0 No -575.17 
 2000q4 0.268 0.073 3.67 0 0 No -590.00 
 2007q3 0.291 0.073 3.99 0 0 No -591.92 
 2008q3 0.362 0.230 1.57 0 0 No -482.65 
Germany 1981q3 0.220 0.162 1.36 0 1 No -516.52 
 1992q1 0.485 0.804 0.60 0 3 Yes -525.91 
 1995q3 0.905 0.452 2.00 0 0 Yes -518.68 
 2002q3 1.161 0.631 1.84 0 0 Yes -509.59 
 2004q1 1.261 0.608 2.07 0 0 Yes -509.64 
 2008q1 0.001 0.152 0.01 0 0 No -514.16 
USA 1981q3 0.552 0.147 3.76 0 3 No -602.32 
 1990q3 0.248 0.087 2.85 0 1 No -585.13 
 2000q4 0.222 0.119 1.87 0 1 No -492.73 
 2008q2 0.540 0.178 3.03 0 1 No -484.45 
 
The output coefficient for Japan takes on its highest value at 1.885 in the early 90’s, but at the 
onset of the crisis (late 2007-mid 2008) it lies (significantly) around 0.3. On the other hand, 
the United States has a statistically significant coefficient (0.540) at the onset of the crisis. 
Germany exhibits (doubtfully) statistically high flexibility in the early-to-mid-2000’s, but the 
coefficient drops to zero at the onset of the crisis, and it is not statistically significant.  
3.3 Concluding Remarks on the Chapter 
The discussion on wage flexibility shows that wage flexibility can be measured in a number 
of ways. When the models differ, evidently the result does the same. My qualitative 
discussion of wage flexibility with respect to bargaining structures rendered Japan as the most 
flexible country, and the US as the least flexible one. Heylen’s (1992) survey reached similar 
results. Steinberg & Nakane (2011) highlight Japan’s flexibility in wages, as does the 
International Monetary Fund (2010), but their finding that the US exhibits even higher wage 
flexibility stands at odds with my argumentation and findings in this and subsequent chapters. 
                                                 
14
 t-statistics were not reported in Steinberg and Nakane’s IMF report. Reported values are my own calculations. 
Otherwise, the table is reported in its entirety.  
27 
 
4.0 Employment Protection Legislation 
and Temporary Contracts 
Wage flexibility alone is insufficient in explaining unemployment responses. In chapter 3 it 
was shown that, if wages are completely flexible, then firms have an important instrument at 
their disposal insofar they are concerned about the outflow of skilled workers, or to the extent 
that they simply care about the well-being of their labor stock. In reality wages are seldom 
completely flexible. Wages are to a greater or lesser extent pre-determined upon contract 
settlement. If wages cannot be adjusted, then an adjustment of the employment level at the 
firm is another option. However, the ease with which firms can adjust their employment level 
is also determined by law.  A firm’s law-imposed costs of firing and rehiring will condition 
the firm’s incentives for such adjustments. An employee is protected from the prospect of 
unemployment by the cost that the firm incurs upon layoff.  
Employment protection legislation (hereafter EPL) consists of the rules and laws that govern 
the costs to employers of dismissing workers. In the event of early termination of a permanent 
employment contract, legal restrictions on the dismissal and worker compensation are 
imposed upon the employer. A number of procedures have to be followed in case of both 
individual and collective dismissals. The final decision on the legitimacy of a layoff may 
ultimately be made by a court ruling (Boeri & van Ours, 2008).   
From an economic viewpoint EPL has two key components: tax and transfer. The transfer 
component consists of severance payments (compensation that is intended to provide 
financial support to ease the transition from one place of work to another) and a mandatory 
advance notice period (a period of time between notification of dismissal and actual 
dismissal). The tax component consists of trial costs (payments to legal advisors) and trial 
costs. Both the severance payment and advance notice are legal minima that apply to all 
employment relationships regardless of what is established by specific contracts. Beyond 
mandatory payments, collective agreements may specify larger severance payments for firm-
initiated separations. EPL also requires that certain administrative procedures are followed 
prior to a layoff. In most countries the employer is required to discuss layoff decisions with 
workers’ representatives. EPL clauses typically apply only to economic dismissals. 
Disciplinary dismissals i.e. worker’s fault dismissals induced by serious, culpable breaches of 
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the employment contract on the worker’s part, typically do not involve monetary transfers 
(ibid).  
4.1 EPL Theory 
We assume an environment in which wages are rigid. An introduction of EPL will therefore 
cause no readjustment of wages. Because the introduction of the severance payment cannot be 
accompanied by a wage reduction, labor supply remains unaffected. 
 
In this environment two states of the world are possible: a good state and a bad state, denoted 
by superscripts h and l, respectively. These two states affect the marginal product of the firm. 
First we imagine an environment in which wages are flexible. The firm’s profits are described 
by: 
πF   i            
(4.1) 
where   denotes labor and    is the price of output, which varies depending of the state of the 
world. If the world is in a good state,    assumes the value   , and if the world is in a bad 
state, then    takes on the value   . We have that   >  . In every period there is a probability 
  that the world is in a good state and a probability       that it is in a bad state. The wage 
is fixed at  regardless of the state of the world.  
The firm has to determine the optimal level of employment. With no EPL adjustments can 
take place at no cost, and the firm can freely choose the profit-maximizing employment level, 
where the marginal product of labor equals the wage rate in any state of the world. With EPL 
in place the firm is forced to keep the same employment level regardless of the state of the 
world. We assume that EPL is unboundedly expensive, and layoffs do not occur. 
Without EPL, the firm chooses employment after having observed the productivity level. The 
first order condition for this problem is: 
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 (4.2) 
Solving for employment we get: 
   
  
 
 if Ai=AL    
(4.3) 
 
    
  
 
  
if A
i
=A
L 
(4.4) 
The firm thus adjusts its stock by      
      
 
 when the economy moves from one state to 
another. Since the economy on average experiences a fraction   of booms and a fraction    
   of recessions, average employment in the long run will be 
 
 
  
           
 
 
(4.5) 
Now we turn to an environment in which EPL is in place, i.e. a rigid regime. Because layoffs 
are prohibitively expensive, the firm’s best strategy is to choose an employment level that 
maximizes the expected value of the profits. This employment level is to be kept constant 
over time independent of cyclical conditions. The firm is faced with the following expected 
profit-maximization problem: 
                                  
(4.6) 
The first order condition of this problem gives in the rigid regime: 
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(4.7) 
This optimal employment level in the rigid regime L
R
 is a weighted average of the levels of 
employment that would prevail in expansions and recessions in an environment without EPL. 
L
R 
coincides with the long-run level of employment in a flexible environment. In other words, 
the long-run level of employment is the same in the two regimes. During the cycle, however, 
the employment level will be lower during upturns and higher during downturns. Only when 
the economy is permanently in one of the two states of the world will L
R
 equal L
F
, i.e. p=0 or 
p=1. We also have that        even in the long run, since the firm is employing suboptimal 
levels in booms and recessions alike, and thus realizes lower profits. 
The conclusions to be drawn from the model above are the following: 
1) EPL with fixed wages has no effects on average employment, but 
2) it does lower the employment fluctuations over the business cycle, and 
3) profits are reduced when EPL is in place (Boeri & van Ours, 2008). 
 
For the purpose of the ensuing discussion, result 2) carries particular relevance. This result 
will be considered together with the effect of temporary contracts.  
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4.2 The Opposing Effects of EPL and Temporary 
Employment 
 
Figure 6: Labor Demand, Employment, and the Effects of EPL and Temporary Employment 
 
Source: Boeri & Garibaldi (2007) in IMF (2010)  
In an economy where EPL is absent, the firm optimally hires at A when times are bad and at 
B when they are good. On the other hand, when EPL is strict (implying that hiring and firing 
are prohibitively expensive) the firm chooses to set average employment at C. The reason is 
increased dismissal costs borne by the employer when EPL becomes stricter. Next we 
introduce temporary employment to the environment. When temporary contracts are 
introduced, the firms can build up a stock of temporary workers when times are good. When 
times are bad, however, adjustment flexibility is not available to the employer because only 
temporary workers can be shed. Thus, during the cycle employment will adjust between B 
and C, leaving average employment at D. Hence, in countries with strict EPL firms will over 
the course of the business cycle adjust employment only to the extent that is allowed by 
natural reorganization. During an upswing, workers who willingly leave will be replaced. If 
times are bad those vacancies will remain unfilled. Employment falls by attrition. So, 
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although the introduction of temporary contracts will increase responsiveness of employment, 
the temporality of these contracts will create a honeymoon effect. Labor is very welcome 
during an upswing, however, employer and employee will separate when demand falls. What 
we have are two opposing effects at work. While stricter EPL lowers the employment 
fluctuations over the business cycle, higher shares of temporary workers increase employment 
fluctuations (International Monetary Fund, 2010).The Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has developed a widely used index to measure EPL 
strictness based on an evaluation of national regulations. Over the past 20 years the majority 
of OECD countries have adjusted EPL toward reducing dismissal costs, above all in the 
countries that already had the strictest standards. These reforms have altered the procedures 
primarily for dismissing and temporary workers. The adjustments have changed the rules for 
new hires through the introduction of a wide range of flexible, fixed-term contracts. The 
scope for existing temporary contracts has also been expanded. On the other hand, open-
ended contracts have barely been touched. In the rare cases in which changes have been made, 
rules have in fact been tightened (Boeri & van Ours, 2008). The standards across countries are 
shown in figures 7, 8, and 9. The incidence of part-time employment and the unemployment 
rate are shown in figures 10 and 11. 
Figure 7: Overall EPL 
Source: OECD  
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Figure 10: Incidence of Part-Time Employment 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 11: The Evolution of Unemployment 
 
 
Source: OECD  
Source: OECD  
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4.2.1 EPL and Temporary Employment in the Respective Countries 
4.2.2 Japan 
Of the three countries, Japan is the country with the lowest unemployment for most of the 
2000s, never exceeding 6 percent. During the crisis unemployment remained far below the 
levels in Germany and the US, rising only about 1 percent. Employment protection 
regulations have fallen for temporary labor since 1990, inducing an increase in temporary 
employment. Strictness standards for permanent employment, however, have remained the 
same. The previous theory section proposes that increased costs of firing and rehiring will 
reduce employment fluctuations, while a greater share of temporary employment will have 
the opposite effect. Unemployment seems to have remained relatively stable through most of 
2008 before it hiked. Since the cost of firing workers on permanent contracts has stayed high 
for the past 20 years, it would be reasonable to assume that the increase to a great extent was 
caused by the dismissal of temporary workers.  
4.2.3 Germany 
Germany had up until the onset of the crisis experienced much higher unemployment levels 
than Japan and the United States, but when crisis hit unemployment surprisingly fluctuated in 
a relatively stable fashion around 7 percent. For both permanent and temporary employment 
Germany has offered the highest degree of protection for the past 20 years relative to the other 
two. Strictness for regular contracts has in fact increased since 1990. Restrictions on 
dismissals of temporary workers have, on the other hand, been relaxed. When we look at the 
incidence of temporary contracts, the largest share is found in Germany for the past ten years. 
Such a high share would suggest that German employers would have the option of adjustment 
flexibility, which in turn would imply greater unemployment fluctuations. However, strict 
regulations on permanent contracts would work in the opposite direction and mitigate those 
fluctuations. Standards on temporary contracts have come down, but compared to those in 
Japan and the United States they are still high. Figure 11 suggests that until the onset of the 
crisis unemployment fluctuations were greater in Germany than in the other two countries, but 
that fluctuations were much lower during the crisis. It seems as though the EPL effect did 
little to stagger unemployment fluctuations until the beginning of the crisis, or alternatively 
that the share-of-temporary-workers effect was stronger than the EPL effect on 
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unemployment. The relatively stable unemployment rate during the crisis, however, stands at 
odds with this proposition. One would think that German employers would exploit the 
flexibility of the large share of temporary contracts to cut losses in times of crisis. If that were 
the case one would expect to observe a hike or somewhat greater fluctuations in 
unemployment. My proposition is that the share-of temporary workers-effect in fact remains 
strong, but that the government-induced work-share program helped mitigate unemployment 
fluctuations. I suggest that without this government effort, one would have observed a greater 
response in unemployment. This will be further investigated in the next chapter.  
4.2.4 The United States  
The sudden unemployment hike can be explained by the generally low levels of employment 
protection. The costs of dismissing are low for both temporary and permanent contracts. Since 
the share of temporary workers in the economy was low to begin with, it is reasonable to 
assume that once this limited flexibility was exhausted, workers with permanent contracts 
were also sacrificed. The decreasing levels of unemployment and its low volatility for much 
of the 2000s can be attributed to the favorable economic conditions of that period. 
4.3 Concluding Remarks on the Chapter 
The laws that govern hiring and firing exert influence on the firms’ employment decisions. 
Strict regulations make employment adjustments costly, and induce the firm to hoard rather 
than to hire and fire. This will reduce employment fluctuations. The share of temporary 
workers in the economy will increase the volatility of employment. Developments in Japan 
and the United States are largely consistent with theory. The large share of temporary 
employment in the German economy can help explain the volatility in unemployment in the 
period leading up to the crisis, despite the strict protection regulations. But in explaining the 
relatively low level of unemployment during the crisis, the theory comes up short. My 
proposition is that the contribution of government-induced work-share programs to 
maintaining German employment was not insignificant. 
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5.0 Work-Sharing 
During the Great Recession Japan, Germany and the United States increased their short-time 
work programs as a tool to stabilize employment as a response to the large output declines. 
The following explains more precisely what these programs entail.  
When demand for output falls, the firm’s need for labor falls along with it. There are two 
ways in which a firm can reduce labor input. The firm can choose between dismissing some 
of the workers, and placing all workers on a shorter work week. Both strategies will reduce 
the total sum of hours worked by the same amount. Work-sharing short-time programs 
involve the latter program.  
5.0.1 Costs and Benefits of Work-Sharing 
Work-sharing can potentially save jobs and prevent unemployment from soaring. Under this 
program the financial burden of a downturn is spread across employers, workers, and 
taxpayers (Vroman et. al. 2009). More concretely, theoretical benefits that can be derived 
from this type of program are: 
 
 The most vulnerable in the labor market - typically young, female, and minority 
workers – will be spared from the disproportionately adverse effects of a layoff. A 
modest reduction in earnings spread across a large pool of workers will mitigate the 
hardships that laid-off workers will experience. 
 Employers are enabled to keep the work force intact. If skilled workers are allowed to 
stay even if the market is weak, the firm’s recruitment and training costs when the 
economy recovers are reduced. 
 The government benefits from keeping more people employed, motivated and 
productive. 
 Deflationary wage pressures will be mitigated. Stabilizing employment and smoothing 
income during a downturn will help mitigate large shifts in domestic demand. 
(International Monetary Fund, 2010), (Ridley, 2009), (Vroman & Brusentsev, 2009).   
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There are also costs associated with short-time work: 
 Job lock could increase during a recession, as program participation requires the 
worker to maintain ties with his employer. This could result in workers staying with 
firms that are in fact not viable. This means that the program might be (ab)used to 
address structural layoffs rather than demand-related ones. This could prevent workers 
from acquiring skills that are required in growing sectors. When the economy picks up 
again unemployment might remain persistently high if workers with obsolete skills 
struggle to find new a job (International Monetary Fund 2010). 
5.0.2 A Simple Theoretical Approach to Work-Sharing 
We consider an exogenous transitory shock to the economy. This shock reduces demand. 
Consequently, the marginal productivity (MPL) of labor falls below the wage rate w. The firm 
will then demand less labor L. In the short run capital and labor are not substitutes, and as a 
consequence the only way for the firm to adjust to the demand fall is to lay off workers, i.e. 
reducing L. 
Now the question the firm is faced with is which employees to fire. Human capital theory 
states that the worker in whom the firm has invested human capital is likelier to be kept than 
the worker with no such human capital. Here we distinguish between two types: 
 Type-A workers with general, unspecified skills who earn wA according to their 
marginal productivity. 
 Type-B workers possess establishment-related human capital. These workers are paid 
a wage rate wB<MPLB. 
 
The exogenous shock has caused a decline in MPL. If we assume that wages are fixed in the 
short run, the rational choice for the firm would be to lay off type-A workers and to keep 
type-B workers in the short run. This result comes from the assumptions   >MPLA and 
  <MPLB. 
In the medium run the firm would keep B even if wB>MPLB. This is because recruiting and 
training costs are still higher than costs of firing if the company returns to the previous 
production level after the downturn. 
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In the long run all employees characterized by       will be laid off.  Thus, work sharing 
does not apply equally for all employees within the firm. Naturally, a firm operating at 
      in the long run is not a viable one. 
So what should the employer do? He could try to maintain regular employment, which is not 
viable in the long run if the recession is long-lasting. Another option is labor hoarding. In this 
case the employer needs to contribute to the short-time work compensation. Additionally, 
there are potential costs of maintaining unused machinery. However, labor hoarding is still 
preferable to layoffs if the expected costs associated with a short-time work program are 
lower than the expected costs of firing and rehiring. Work sharing reduces the costs of labor 
for the firm, since it only has to pay for work actually performed. Furthermore, the firm 
avoids losing firm-specific human capital to other firms. Finally, internal turbulence may also 
be avoided. 
What should the employee do? For the worker work sharing prevents or delays 
unemployment. The job is at risk, but the existence of work sharing indicates that the firm 
prefers keeping him to firing him. The price the employee has to pay for this arrangement is 
partial income loss. Thus, he is left with two options: To stay and participate in the work 
sharing program is one. The other is to leave the job. A rational individual will prefer work 
sharing to changing jobs if the costs of the former are lower than those of the latter. In leaving 
the firm for a new job the worker exposes himself to unemployment, uncertainty about future 
income, loss of social status and social network, and also psychological stress. 
What is the government’s approach to work sharing? The options it can choose between are 
1) compensating the loss of work in order to stabilize employment, and 2) compensating for 
unemployment. Work sharing is only preferable if job losses are temporary and not due to 
structural deficits. If work sharing is ruled out, then unemployment insurance would have to 
grant benefits and labor market services. On the one hand work, sharing helps avoid 
deskilling and loss of human capital since it keeps workers employed. On the other hand, 
work sharing weakens the incentive to reallocate workers between firms. However, 
reallocation carries the risk of periods of unemployment, which may lead to deterioration of 
skills (Crimman et al., 2010).    
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5.1 Differences between Respective Work-Sharing 
Schemes 
In the following we take a closer look at the extent to which the respective countries utilized 
work-sharing programs. The main findings suggest that the US to a lesser extent put to use 
such a program. In order to be able to give the reason why, we must examine the respective 
programs. It turns out that there are considerable differences in design, coverage, 
participation, and coverage. 
5.1.1 Japan 
The Japanese and German short-time program responses are similar in many respects, but 
some notable differences must be stressed.  
Over the course of the recent crisis Japan experienced a dramatic fall in demand, and had to 
resort to work-sharing. On 23 March 2009 a tripartite agreement to attain employment 
security and creation was concluded between the Prime Minister, the Japan Business 
Federation, the Japan Chamber of Commerce and Industry, the National Federation of Small 
Business Associations, and the Japanese Trade Union Confederation. The declared goals of 
this agreement were the following: To promote employment maintenance, to consolidate 
employment safety nets through vocational training and job placement services, to secure the 
stability of livelihood for those struggling to find employment, and finally, to simply to create 
more jobs. The “Japanese-style work sharing program”, tailored for the Japanese labor 
market, falls under the first of the goals in the agreement. With the tradition of lifetime 
employment serving as a cornerstone of the corporate culture, layoffs are considered a last 
resort remedy. A wide range of other measures will be tried before resorting to layoffs. This 
includes “reduction of overtime work, suspension of operations, education and training, and 
temporary transfer”. The workers are urged to accept the necessity of transfers, often to other 
places (Japanese Trade Union Confederation (RENGO), 2009). 
5.1.2 Germany 
In Germany, much like in Japan, there is a long tradition of trustful and thoughtful 
cooperation between employers and workers. German work-sharing, called Kurzarbeit, can be 
divided into three groups: 
41 
 
 “Transfer-Kurzarbeit”. This program is developed for permanent loss of employment 
caused by restructuring measures on the establishment level. This was a useful 
measure against mass lay-offs when a large share of the East-German industry 
collapsed in the aftermath of the German reunification.  
 A seasonal short-time work program exists for the construction sector and other 
outdoor professions in order to compensate for low demand and weather conditions. 
Without this program seasonal workers would lose employment in the winter. 
 The program most extensively used compensates for “temporary, unavoidable loss of 
employment due to economic factors or to an unavoidable event”. This alleviates the 
burden of an economic crisis, so that firms can maintain employment. 
 Work-sharing differs from unemployment benefits in the sense that compensation is 
granted to the employer and not to the individual (Crimman et. al. 2010) 
5.1.3 The United States  
In the US, short-time Compensation (STC) is administered by state unemployment agencies. 
A temporary national program was enacted in 1982, and permanent changes to federal laws 
allowing states to adopt STC programs were made in 1992. STC in the US works according to 
the following: Application procedures are developed by the state unemployment insurance 
(hereafter UI) agency for employers who anticipate the need to reduce work hours, but who at 
the same time wish to maintain employment. There is usually a minimum reduction in labor 
input, which can be specified in terms of the number of workers affected or a percentage 
reduction in work hours. There is also a maximum allowable reduction, typically 40 or 50 
percent. If workers are covered by a collective bargaining agreement, then approval must be 
secured by the union. 
The STC plan specifies the reduction in work hours, which unit of the plant will be affected 
and the duration of the program. For instance, if work hours need to be reduced by 20 percent, 
workers are placed on a four-day week. The workers can then apply for unemployment 
insurance benefits for the fifth day. If eligible, they receive one fifth of their weekly UI 
benefits for that day. Affected workers can, of course, receive benefits only for a limited span, 
for example 26 or 52 weeks within a 52-week benefit year. Benefit payments are deducted 
from total entitlement for that benefit year (Vroman & Brusentsev, 2009). 
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5.1.5 A Comparison of the Programs  
Utilization of STC’s in the US is low compared to that of Germany and Japan. At the 
beginning of 2009, only 19 out of the 50 states actually had STC programs, and these 
programs have been “consistently small” in all 19 states and in some practically in a state of 
inactivity. The reasons why STC is used on such a small scale are simply that many 
companies do not know about it, and that few states advertise it. Also, the tendency of 
employers to rely heavily on layoffs even STC programs are active is a feature in the US.   
Furthermore, since in the United States STC payments are deducted from total entitlement for 
that benefit year, eligible workers may be reluctant to make use of the program if they think 
they are going to be laid off anyhow later on. For every STC dollar received a dollar is 
deducted from the unemployment benefit entitlement. This feature is not present in Germany 
or Japan. In these two countries one distinguishes between partial employment with benefits 
and complete unemployment. The unemployed has full entitlement to unemployment benefits 
regardless of previous utilization of STC. In other words, the worker’s eligibility for regular 
unemployment insurance benefits is not affected if he participates in a short-time program for 
a while, but later loses his job entirely.  
Additionally, US employers are subject to experience rating. This practice uses an employer’s 
past claims to calculate future contribution rates. The more claims a firms makes, the higher 
are its contribution rates. This feature is also absent in the German and Japanese short-time 
work programs. The absence of such requirements increases the incentive to use the programs 
to smooth fluctuations in labor demand (Vroman & Brusentsev, 2009). 
There are also differences in how the programs are financed. In Germany, both employers and 
employees help finance Kurzarbeit through payroll taxes. In Japan the Employment 
Adjustment Subsidy (EAS) is funded by employer contributions to a reserve, which is part of 
the Employment Insurance System. 
Finally, due to the severity of the recession Germany and Japan decided to expand their short-
time programs. In the US, on the other hand, no such expansion occurred. In the former two, 
expansion took place in two respects. Firstly, eligibility was extended in duration and came to 
include also non-regular workers. Kurzarbeit, which initially had a maximum duration of 12 
months, was extended to 18 months, and then later on again to 24 months. Secondly, funding 
was increased. The Japanese Employment Adjustment Subsidy allowed for increases in the 
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subsidy component. Large corporations were allowed an increase from 67 percent to 75 
percent, while small and medium-size firms were allowed an increase from 80 percent to 90 
percent. Hijzen and Venn (2011) estimate that the programs saved 235 000 and 415 000 jobs 
in Germany and Japan, respectively.  
Fact box on Short-Time Work Programs
15
 (September 2008-September 2009)  
 Peak usage, 
percent of 
labor force 
Peak Usage Change in 
Unemployment 
Rate 
Eligibility Duration Experience Rating Funding 
Germany 3.5 April 2009 0.5 Yes Yes No Payroll  
Japan 3.8 July 2009 1.42 Yes  Yes No General 
fiscal 
USA 0.5 May 2009 3.506 No No Yes State, 
Payroll 
5.1.4 Concluding Remarks on the Chapter  
Figure 12
16
 illustrates the differences in usage of short-time work programs between the three 
countries. One can see from the graph that the utilization of these programs was markedly 
greater in Germany and Japan than in the US. Following the low utilization throughout the 
summer of 2008, a sudden rise took place after global demand fell. Germany was the first 
country to experience a sharp increase, in which more than one and a half million workers 
joined the program at the peak. This increase was the largest since reunification. The Japanese 
reaction occurred a little later; however more than half a million enrollees joined the EAS 
program. Short-time work subsidies in May 2009 alone exceeded the annual subsidy in any 
year in the span 2003-2007. As can be seen, utilization was much smaller in the US, and this 
type of program was a much smaller component of firms’ responses. However, participation 
within the US was much greater compared to previous downturns.  
The discussion suggests that short-time work programs were much more successful in Japan 
and Germany than in the Unites States. The fact that not all states were covered resulted in 
limited availability for affected workers. Further, deduction from total entitlement and 
experience rating made both workers and employers reluctant to engage in the program. 
Funding through taxes or reserves made it easier to make use of such programs in Japan and 
Germany. This can be seen from the fact box above, where peak usage reached much higher 
percentages in Japan and Germany than in the United States. The efficacy of the work 
                                                 
15
 Presented as reported in International Monetary Fund (2010). 
16
 The graph was collected from IMF International Monetary Fund (IMF), 2010, “Recovery, Risk, and 
Rebalancing” IMF Economic Outlook April 2010. The original graph as presented in the report includes Japan, 
Germany, the United States and Italy.  
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programs still seems difficult to measure, but the International Monetary Fund (2010) finds 
that “[] it is still likely that the sheer scale of short-time work programs in the current 
recession contributed to the smaller changes in unemployment rates relative to other 
countries.” As for reasons why work-share programs were more extensively used, I propose 
that the cooperative nature of the Japanese and German labor institutions in the form of more 
on-the-job investment and mutual involvement made such programs more attractive to the 
authorities. This will be discussed in the next chapter. 
Figure 12: Short-Time Work throughout the Crisis 
Source: International Monetary Fund (2010)  
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6.0 The Institutional Characteristics 
and Their Cultural and Tradition-
Related Roots  
The above sections on employment protection, work-sharing schemes, unions, and wage 
flexibility have hopefully helped to understand the configurations of the respective labor 
markets. These characteristics in turn explain why labor markets responded to the Great 
Depression the way they did. In other words, sections 3 and 4 are primarily descriptive in 
nature. What these sections do not is give the underlying reasons why the labor markets are 
configured the way they are. The aim of this section is to fill this void. In order to gain an 
understanding of labor market differences across countries, one must look to the laws and 
regulations of the labor markets and the institutions of industrial relations. But laws and 
institutions are themselves endogenous, shaped by exogenous factors such as culture and 
tradition. Some problems arise in this connection. Culture and tradition are rather intangible 
factors and not easily quantified or easily included in formal models. Their contribution to 
economic analysis is in my view nevertheless important. This section shows that employment 
relations in Japan and Germany to a great degree are characterized by cooperation and mutual 
understanding. In these two countries this relationship is marked by the will to pull in the 
same direction while the employer-employee relationship in the United States is more 
adversarial. Labor and management in the former two play the roles of one another’s 
watchdog, while at the same time working like a cooperative, while in the latter the parties 
seem only to be playing the roles of watchdogs, always trying to make sure the opposing 
parties do not move beyond the proper limits. A higher degree of cooperation leads to lower 
levels of tension and conflict, which in turn is suggestive of more flexible labor. To the extent 
that labor is flexible in terms of wages, hours, and job-rotation, firms may in the event of 
falling demand adjustments in pay, hours, and work organization before cutting employment. 
 
 
 
46 
 
6.1 Japan 
6.1.1 Labor-Management Relations 
The role of the union differs significantly between Japan and Germany on the one hand, and 
the United States on the other. While the United States was founded on the principle of 
capitalism and individualism, the Japanese and German societies to a greater extent place 
their beliefs in collectivism. The Japanese style of unionism in one in which employer and 
employees invest in information reliability. Through the enterprise union (the organization of 
a single trade union within one plant or multiplant enterprise rather than within a craft or 
industry) workers’ shirking is controlled, and so are any harmful actions on the part of the 
employer. In order to promote mutual well-being, major decisions are made after close 
consultations between management and union. In many firms management and labor consult 
with each other throughout the year through a joint consultation system. Meetings take place 
on a regular basis. This type of system exists even in non-unionized sectors. Joint consultation 
advances the harmonization of individual and organizational goals (Hashimoto, 1990).   
Disagreements do occur between labor and management, but in a comparison with the United 
States, these seem to be less frequent. Precisely because unions and management work closely 
together, legal disputes are settled through negotiation and mutual understanding. Further, 
grievances with no legal basis are settled by superiors in an informal manner. The number of 
labor cases reaching the public office for dispute settlement is considerably smaller in Japan 
than elsewhere. And if a case does go to dispute settlement, there is still heavy reliance on 
compromise and conciliation rather than on formal decisions. The number of labor-
management disputes reaching public settlement is smaller in Japan than in the US (ibid). 
6.1.2 Tenure and Earnings Profiles 
A prominent feature of the Japanese labor market is so-called lifetime employment, a practice 
that became prevalent during the years of high economic growth, starting sometime in the 
first half of the 20
th
 century. The introduction of assembly line production called for narrow-
skilled workers who could work on particular machines rather than workers with a broad set 
of skills (Gordon, 1982). In order to have their training investment pay off firms moved to 
lifetime employment. Worker loyalty was attained through seniority-based wages. Previously 
mobile and independent Japanese workers thus became tied to their employer long-term. This 
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practice, although not guaranteed by statute or collective bargaining agreement, is long-
established and works in the following way: The worker enters a firm after graduation and 
starts building his career at the bottom of the hierarchy of that company. The employer, if 
possible, does not lay off the worker even in bad times. In exchange, the employee sticks with 
his employer until retirement age. The worker derives the benefits of job security and good 
prospects for promotions and pay increases through a seniority wage system. The company, in 
turn, benefits from the reduced possibility of outflow of workers with firm-specific human 
capital. Workers with long tenure accumulate knowledge and technique acquired through 
training and experience (Hashimoto, 1990).  
Long-term employment relations between firm and worker as such are not exclusive to Japan, 
and neither do Japanese long-term relations involve all types of workers. Lifetime 
employment is mainly concentrated in large firms and ends when the workers reach 55 years 
of age. Furthermore, it does not apply to women or employees sent from subcontractors. In 
the US as well does a large fraction of workers hold what are essentially lifetime jobs (Hall, 
1980 in Gordon, 1982). It is the role of seniority rather than duration that distinguishes the 
Japanese system. In the Japanese system the seniority system is an important ingredient in 
conflict minimization. Gordon (1982) depicts the Japanese firm as a very harmonious place 
for both employers and employees alike. All employees are, whatever their talent, believed to 
be doing their best to serve the company, and therefore no one should be discriminated 
against. People who interact everyday and know they will be continuing to do so for the rest 
of their lives will develop a unique relationship (Ouchi, 1981 in Gordon, 1982). At the core of 
conflict minimization lies the high degree of egalitarianism. The social life at firm level is 
characterized by a egalitarian structure, in which no distinction is made between blue and 
white-collar workers, speech is informal and familiar as compared to more formal address 
with outsiders, no distinction is made between annual salaries and hourly pay, one-class 
company cafeteria, and communality of access to sick pay, sports clubs, and vacation resorts 
(Glazer, 1976 in Gordon 1982).  
The tendency of Japanese long-term employment is not only a result of the way wage 
payments are made, but also of the type of work organization. A notable feature in Japanese 
firms is the job-rotation system by which workers are rotated among different tasks so that 
they can acquire a wide range of skills. Japanese workers are trained not only in technical 
skills, but also in skills that make them effective team players. The Japanese training practices 
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make workers flexible not only within their organization, but also in subsidiary organizations. 
With skills that are useful in many divisions within the company, a demand decline in one 
division does not necessarily lead to layoffs of affected workers. Thus, the investments that 
Japanese firms make in human capital lead to a decrease in job turnover of skilled workers 
(Hashimoto, 1990).  In the United States, on the other hand, firms have since the post-war 
years tended to emphasize specialized skills and job demarcation (whereby job descriptions 
are formulated in detail). This environment has made it difficult to foster multifunctional 
workers. Japanese firms encourage the sharing of knowledge and tasks across workers, 
thereby enabling them to deal with new circumstances and new requirements. When a worker 
is trained in a wider array of tasks, the likelihood that he will oppose the introduction of labor-
saving technology falls, since he can easily be transferred to perform another type of task. 
Then, since workers can easily be reassigned, the sensitivity of labor inputs to changes in 
demand should be less responsive. Since flexibility is to be found in worker multifunctionality, 
wages, work hours and inventory, firms can avoid making employment adjustments. 
Hashimoto (1990) finds that Japanese manufacturing firms to a greater extent rely on 
adjustments in hours and inventories relative to adjustments in employment. Common 
measures are cutting overtime, dismissing temporary workers, stopping new recruitment and 
not filling vacancies, and transferring workers to other plants or related companies or 
subidiaries (Koshiro, 1984). In ways similar to the Japanese system, German firms can also 
enjoy the flexibility of adjustments in hours. When faced with a demand shock, firms can 
exercise overtime reduction and working time accounts
17
 (Crimman et. al. 2010). American 
employers rely to a greater extent on employment adjustments to deal with demand changes. 
The relative inflexibility of American workers is not the only reason why tenure is shorter. In 
both Japan and Germany, returns to additional peak later than in the US. This weakens the 
incentives for the American worker to stay attached to the same employer (Couch, 2003). 
Cullen (1985) points out that American firms also resort to retraining, work-sharing (in this 
context not government-sponsored), and interplant transfers, but this strategy seems to be 
used more narrowly. 
 
 
                                                 
17
 Working time accounts allow companies to deviate temporarily from the agreed weekly working time by 
compensating the worker with free time within a specified span. 
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6.1.3 Wage-Bargaining and Contract Settlement 
In Japan bargaining takes place management and the enterprise union at each firm. 
Nevertheless, simultaneous negotiations during the so-called “spring offensive” have 
contributed to a standardization of wage increases across firms. The simultaneous and annual 
wage adjustments have been viewed as responsible for the prevalent wage flexibility in Japan. 
Furthermore, another manifestation of flexibility is the short, abstract, and often obscure 
nature of the collective agreements. The brevity emphasizes the flexibility: there exists a 
mutual understanding among the involved parties that contract terms may have to change in 
response to new circumstances, thereby making detailed stipulations unnecessary (Hashimoto, 
1990). In the West it is considered important to formulate contracts in as precise and detailed 
a manner as possible. The greater degree of heterogeneity in the American labor market 
caused by massive immigration during the main industrialization period partially explains 
why everything is put into written contracts and why consequently a massive legal profession 
is established to interpret the nuances of such contracts (Gordon, 1982). Conflict avoidance is 
key in this context. The Japanese can allow for annual negotiations because costs are low. 
Gray (1978) argues that contract length is an increasing function of contracting costs. Along 
this line of argumentation, the shorter contract length in the Japanese labor market can be 
attributed to less costly negotiations. This helps explain why the Japanese have one-year wage 
contracts and why three-year contracts are prevalent in the US.  
The existence of bonus payments is another indicator of flexibility. Bonus payments can be 
interpreted as a form of profit sharing, which in itself can be seen as conflict dampener 
(Hashimoto, 1979 in Gordon, 1982). When times are good the workers get to take part in the 
success, and when times are bad all share the burden of the downturn. This greater reliance on 
bonus payments can be seen as a result of the greater importance of firm-specific human 
capital. The average Japanese worker relies heavily on bonus payments as a dependable 
income source, and these bonuses make up a sizable share of the annual earnings of Japanese 
workers. Bonus payments for American production workers, on the other hand, are rare. 
Hashimoto (1990) reports that bonuses in the U.S. amounted to less than 1 percent of total 
compensation in the period between 1965 and 1981, whereas in Japan this share amounted to 
21 percent. The presence of bonus payments plus the fact that wages are renegotiated every 
spring contribute to flexible wages. This feature of the Japanese earnings profile conforms to 
the findings in chapter 3.   
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6.2 Germany 
6.2.1 Labor-Management Relations 
Much like in Japan, the German ideal of cooperation and collectivism indeed harmonizes with 
the existence of unions. German employers willingly recognize unions, not because they are 
obligated by law, but simply because “this is how business is run” (Waldman, 2003). German 
labor-management relations seem by American standards “[like] a worker’s paradise. It even 
stands out in labor-friendly Western Europe, with its unions still retaining significant power 
and its workers enjoying more time off than those in most other countries” (Landler, 2005).  
German work councils bring stability to the workplace and represent workers as one 
collective voice. American stewards do not bring these benefits to the same extent. German 
employers favor this system because works councils are entirely made up of workplace 
employees. Works council members are seen as “insiders” with loyalties in alignment with 
the goals of the firm, whereas unions, the “outsiders”, are not involved in management 
decisions. While works councils work to protect the workers’ interest, they also go against the 
union if they believe a decision is to the benefit of the firm. By making members of the works 
council share responsibility in decisions with management, employers can make sure the 
decisions made are optimal. At the same time, workers are assured that their best interests 
were considered. German workers’ and management’s interests are more closely aligned with 
each other. The result of this type of mutual understanding between employee and 
management is that German employees stay at the same firm much longer than in the United 
States. In the United States management is distrustful of unions because unions must 
negotiate over a broader range of qualitative issues. Employers view the unions as advancing 
beyond the proper limits into the management’s decision-making power. On the shop floor 
level, American employers complain about the lack of commitment on the employees’ part. 
However, many American workers are hired on an at-will basis. Employment-at-will is a 
common law doctrine and implies that employees can be fired for “good reason, bad reason, 
or no reason at all” (Waldman, 2003).  
German employers have established their own associations in order to deal with the massive 
unions. Employer associations are responsible for negotiating wages and hours with the 
responsible union in the same industry. This way uniform wages and hours are more easily 
attained throughout an entire industry. U.S. employers, on the other hand, are generally not 
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willing to organize and bargain with unions collectively. This results in competition among 
union and non-union workers, and it also adds to the employer’s hostility towards unions. 
Unions can typically negotiate higher wages for its members. Higher wages lead to increasing 
labor costs for the employer. Hostility prevails not only between unions and employers, but 
also between different unions. As a result workers are left with less collective power to 
negotiate with employers because limited resources are used to fight each other instead of for 
the benefit of the union members as a whole (ibid). 
While German employers willingly accept agreements negotiated with industry-wide unions 
and even extend collective bargaining agreements to non-union members, in the Unites States 
the benefits of centralized bargaining are absent since industry-wide bargaining is not 
practiced to the same extent. Unions even struggle to get employers to apply agreements to 
union workers already in the first place. Thus, only a small share of workers is even covered 
by collective agreements. The majority of American workers, who are not union members, 
consequently have no collective voice and no workplace representation (ibid). 
German law grants workers the right to participate in management decisions. These involve 
the hiring of managers and investment decisions concerning workers. Worker representatives 
sit on advisory boards in nearly equal numbers with shareholder representatives. These 
advisory boards elect members to the management board and also oversee the activities of the 
management board. Thus, German workers are very much involved in managerial decisions. 
This kind of interaction is non-existent in the United States. American unions want no part in 
management. While the union-management relationship is cooperative, unions in the United 
States view theirs as confrontational. While in the German system all involved parties will 
benefit from cooperation, in the U.S. system each party has opposing interests. The general 
attitude is that benefits can only be attained through concessions from the other parties (ibid).  
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6.3 The United States 
6.3.1 Labor-Management Relations 
The American ideal of capitalism and individualism does not harmonize with the existence of 
unions, which gives the workers a collective voice. Labels such as “communists” and “labor 
bosses” are not uncommon. The union must not only overcome resistance from employers, 
but also the workers’ potential disinclination to a collective voice, since a collective voice still 
would conflict with the idea of individualism.  
American unions handle both negotiation and administration of collective bargaining 
agreements, while German unions primarily deal with negotiation. In Germany it is not just 
the union that represents the interests of the workers; there are also works councils and 
worker representatives on the supervisory boards. Through the works councils the workers’ 
interests in daily and social matters are considered, and through worker representatives on 
supervisory boards workers are given a voice in management decisions. The American system 
does not have an equivalent to this three-tiered system. American workers only have a union 
steward, the equivalent of works councils, to protect their interests (Waldman, 2003). 
6.3.2 Wage-Bargaining and Contract Settlement 
While the Japanese find it both impossible and unnecessary to make provisions for every 
possible eventuality, Westerners see no way a dispute can be settled without reference to a 
complete description of the rights and obligations of both parties (Hashimoto, 1990). US 
wage bargains feature longer-term contracts with cost-of-living protection, dating back to the 
1948 contract between the United Auto Workers and General Motors. The years 1946-1948 
were marked by annual strikes or threats of strikes in core industries, which made contract 
negotiations costly. The resulting compromise was management’s acquisition of long-term 
contracts in return for protection against living costs. Hence, the determinant factor is the 
level of industrial conflict. Gordon (1982) argues that greater power and strike-inclination of 
American labor helps explain the persistence of staggered contract expiration dates. Again, 
using Gray’s (1978) argumentation, longer-term contracts are the result of costly negotiations.  
For the years 1964-1976 the days lost from strikes were calculated to be far greater in the US 
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than in Japan (Smith, 1980 in Gordon, 1982). Government and management may be reluctant 
to allow for simultaneous expiration dates, as this makes possible a nationwide general strike.  
6.4 Main Differences and Concluding Remarks on 
the Chapter 
The American labor market seems to be characterized by an adversarial labor-management 
relationship, where labor and management are in effect opposing parties who more or less 
seem to antagonize each other. In contrast, Japanese and German labor-management relations 
are ones in which employers and employees strive to understand each other and reach a 
compromise in order to serve a mutual goal. This contrast between individualism and 
egalitarianism is reflected in various facets of the labor markets. The all-encompassing factor, 
namely the relationship between those on the shop floor and those who administrate, is more 
harmonious in Japan and Germany.  
The relative ease with which contracts are settled upon is but one indicator of this harmony. 
Brief and obscure labor contracts that allow for continuous adjustment and annual wage 
negotiations stand in contrast with detailed and longer-term contracts that characterize the 
U.S. market. The more heterogeneous work force and the greater importance of industrial 
conflict in the U.S. play a significant role in explaining these differences. 
Tenure is longer in the countries in which worker-management relationships are smoother, or 
where the workers are multi-functional. Hashimoto & Raisian (1990) point to the off-the-job 
activities that employers and employees engage in as an indicator of mutual commitment. 
Disputes are settled early and in an informal manner. By the same token, worker participation 
in managerial decisions and the willingness of German employers to accept agreements with 
industry-wide unions and even to extend them to non-union members shows the will to 
concede in order to achieve mutual goals. Such features are virtually absent in the U.S., where 
benefits can only be achieved at the expense of the opposing party. In addition to the closer 
relationships that characterize German and Japanese labor markets, returns to experience peak 
later in these countries than in the US. This also creates an incentive for German and Japanese 
workers to remain longer with their employers. 
The relative versatility of Japanese workers makes it easer for firms to reassign them to other 
tasks, whereas the specialized skills of American workers make transfers a more difficult 
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strategy. Further, the relative ease with which German and Japanese firms can adjust work 
hours (after overtime hours have been reduced and fixed-term contracts have expired without 
prolongation) makes it easier to hoard labor. 
Thus, the discussion suggests that the willingness of two parties to cooperate fosters 
flexibility on both sides that helps keep employment up in adverse times. The environment in 
which U.S labor and management deal with one another, on the other hand, leads to limited 
options for American firms. 
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7.0 Conclusion 
The goal of this paper has been to demonstrate how different labor market characteristics have 
influenced the unemployment responses between Japan, Germany, and the United States. The 
first section suggested that U.S. unemployment would be expected to react the strongest to an 
output decline, while the weakest reaction would be found in Japan. Next, I have attributed 
these differences to different degrees of wage flexibility. The study of the nature of wage 
bargaining suggested that wages in Japan and Germany would be more flexible in times of 
declining demand and increasing unemployment. The discussion further suggests that 
American firms, because of low levels of coordination among firms and longer-term 
contracts, have little leeway in adjusting wages. The literature I have used for this section 
largely, but not unequivocally, concurs with my findings. Heylen’s (1992) compilation almost 
unambiguously accorded with my conclusion on the matter. There were nevertheless some 
discrepancies. Particularly, while highlighting Japan as a high-flexibility country, Steinberg 
and Nakane (2011) present regression results in which the United States is even more flexible 
in terms of wages. 
Further, I have considered the effects of worker protection and the share of temporary workers 
in the work force on unemployment sensitivity. Theory suggests that the higher EPL is, the 
more costly are firms’ employment adjustments. Thus, countries where legislation is strict are 
expected to experience more sensitive responses than countries with lenient legislation. The 
literature points to the increase in temporary workers in the work force as a result of the 
relaxation of EPL for temporary labor. The greater the share of temporary workers with little 
protection, the greater the unemployment response. These effects have been considered 
against the evolution of unemployment in the respective countries. My discussion suggests 
that in Germany, where both EPL is strict and the share of temporary workers is high, the 
share-of-temporary-workers effect is the strongest. In the case of Japan, where EPL is slightly 
more lenient in than in Germany (but still way stricter than in the United States), and where 
the share of temporary workers is high as well, the temporary-labor effect predominantly 
accounts for the unemployment increase. In the United States the unemployment response can 
be attributed to the overall low levels of worker protection. 
The severity of the crisis induced national authorities to implement large-scale work-sharing 
programs. These programs were intended to help firms hold on their employees. By 
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distributing the burden of the downturn on employers, workers and taxpayers, firms were 
enabled to evade mass-layoffs, and unemployment was kept from soaring. In the countries 
where this strategy was implemented, namely Japan and Germany, unemployment was 
contained much better than where it was not. The success of the programs in the two former 
indicates that had the U.S. program followed their example, it could have helped curb the 
unemployment increase. 
Finally, I have discussed the relevance of cultural differences in explaining the institutional 
characteristics. Here, the literature points to contrasts between the cooperative nature of labor-
management relations in Japan and German, and the more adversarial environment that 
characterizes those of the United States. Cooperation fosters flexibility on both sides, whereby 
other options are available to firms before dismissing their workers. These differences in 
interpersonal relationships in turn rest upon the different intangible ideals of individualism 
and collectivism.  
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Appendix 
Regression results for tables 1 and 2 are reported below. To check for heteroskedasticity I 
have first estimated the error term  ̂  Next, I have estimated the function   ̂          
                                   by least squares. The results are reported 
below the table results. Further, a Lagrange multiplier test has been performed to see if 
heteroskedasticity exists. 
Definitions: 
Changeinunemployment (Japan & Germany), percentageunemploymentchange 
(USA) 
    
gdpgpsa     
gdpgpsalag1       
unemploymentlag1       
unemploymentlag2       
unemploymentlag3       
dyDUM       
dyDUMLag1         
duDUMLag1         
duDUMLag2         
duDUMLag3         
recession   
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Regression Results, Table 1, Japan 
reg  changeinunemployment gdpgpsa gdpgpsalag1 unemploymentlag1 unemploymentlag2 
unemploymentlag3 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      71 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    65) =    1.96 
       Model |  .028321975     5  .005664395           Prob > F      =  0.0967 
    Residual |  .188014513    65  .002892531           R-squared     =  0.1309 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0641 
       Total |  .216336488    70  .003090521           Root MSE      =  .05378 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
changeinun~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     gdpgpsa |  -.0085706   .0083931    -1.02   0.311    -.0253327    .0081915 
 gdpgpsalag1 |  -.0204748   .0083952    -2.44   0.017    -.0372412   -.0037084 
unemployme~1 |  -.2080493   .1198795    -1.74   0.087    -.4474652    .0313666 
unemployme~2 |  -.1536245   .1197487    -1.28   0.204    -.3927792    .0855302 
unemployme~3 |  -.1236923    .118323    -1.05   0.300    -.3599997    .1126152 
       _cons |   .0243668   .0083034     2.93   0.005     .0077838    .0409499 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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reg  e2 gdpgpsa gdpgpsalag1 unemploymentlag1 unemploymentlag2 unemploymentlag3 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      71 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    65) =    0.41 
       Model |  .000018535     5  3.7070e-06           Prob > F      =  0.8430 
    Residual |  .000593674    65  9.1334e-06           R-squared     =  0.0303 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0443 
       Total |  .000612209    70  8.7458e-06           Root MSE      =  .00302 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          e2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     gdpgpsa |   .0000242   .0004716     0.05   0.959    -.0009177    .0009661 
 gdpgpsalag1 |  -.0003505   .0004717    -0.74   0.460    -.0012926    .0005917 
unemployme~1 |  -.0081382   .0067363    -1.21   0.231    -.0215916    .0053152 
unemployme~2 |  -.0021794    .006729    -0.32   0.747    -.0156181    .0112593 
unemployme~3 |   .0017413   .0066489     0.26   0.794    -.0115374      .01502 
       _cons |   .0028485   .0004666     6.10   0.000     .0019166    .0037803 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
The   -distribution with 70 degrees of freedom is: 
  =                      
The 5% critical value is 90.531. Thus, again we conclude that heteroskedasticity is 
not present. 
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Regression Results, Table 1, Germany 
 
reg  changeinunemployment gdpgpsa gdpgpsalag1 unemploymentlag1 unemploymentlag2 
unemploymentlag3 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      66 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    60) =    4.68 
       Model |  .110661493     5  .022132299           Prob > F      =  0.0011 
    Residual |  .283708375    60  .004728473           R-squared     =  0.2806 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.2207 
       Total |  .394369868    65  .006067229           Root MSE      =  .06876 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
changeinun~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     gdpgpsa |  -.0229152   .0135636    -1.69   0.096    -.0500464    .0042161 
 gdpgpsalag1 |  -.0195138   .0133727    -1.46   0.150    -.0462632    .0072355 
unemployme~1 |  -.3105832   .1162582    -2.67   0.010    -.5431342   -.0780323 
unemployme~2 |  -.0837839   .1198668    -0.70   0.487    -.3235532    .1559853 
unemployme~3 |  -.3729398   .1159288    -3.22   0.002     -.604832   -.1410476 
       _cons |   .0331724   .0112952     2.94   0.005     .0105787    .0557662 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
 
 
 
 
64 
 
reg  e2 gdpgpsa gdpgpsalag1 unemploymentlag1 unemploymentlag2 unemploymentlag3 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      66 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    60) =    1.58 
       Model |  .000318503     5  .000063701           Prob > F      =  0.1797 
    Residual |  .002420163    60  .000040336           R-squared     =  0.1163 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0427 
       Total |  .002738665    65  .000042133           Root MSE      =  .00635 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          e2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     gdpgpsa |   .0004692   .0012527     0.37   0.709    -.0020366    .0029751 
 gdpgpsalag1 |   .0016609   .0012351     1.34   0.184    -.0008097    .0041314 
unemployme~1 |   .0029527   .0107377     0.27   0.784    -.0185258    .0244313 
unemployme~2 |   .0009023    .011071     0.08   0.935    -.0212429    .0230475 
unemployme~3 |  -.0247168   .0107072    -2.31   0.024    -.0461345   -.0032991 
       _cons |   .0037017   .0010432     3.55   0.001      .001615    .0057885 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
The    distribution with 65 degrees of freedom is: 
     ×                    
The 5% critical value is approximately 85. Thus, yet again we conclude that 
heteroskedasticity is not present. However, since the coefficient for       shows a 
high t-value, heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are computed. 
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reg changeinunemployment gdpgpsa gdpgpsalag1 unemploymentlag1 unemploymentlag2 
unemploymentlag3, vce (robust) 
Linear regression                                      Number of obs =      66 
                                                       F(  5,    60) =    5.69 
                                                       Prob > F      =  0.0002 
                                                       R-squared     =  0.2806 
                                                       Root MSE      =  .06876 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
             |               Robust 
changeinun~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     gdpgpsa |  -.0229152   .0173834    -1.32   0.192    -.0576872    .0118569 
 gdpgpsalag1 |  -.0195138   .0127505    -1.53   0.131    -.0450187     .005991 
unemployme~1 |  -.3105832   .0932404    -3.33   0.001    -.4970918   -.1240747 
unemployme~2 |  -.0837839   .0984812    -0.85   0.398    -.2807757    .1132078 
unemployme~3 |  -.3729398   .1045095    -3.57   0.001      -.58199   -.1638896 
       _cons |   .0331724    .012789     2.59   0.012     .0075905    .0587543 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Regression Results, Table 1, the United States 
 
reg  percentageunemploymentchange gdpgpsa gdpgpsalag1 unemploymentlag1 
unemploymentlag2 unemploymentlag3 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      69 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    63) =   14.69 
       Model |  .364796564     5  .072959313           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .312953323    63  .004967513           R-squared     =  0.5382 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.5016 
       Total |  .677749886    68   .00996691           Root MSE      =  .07048 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
p~unemploy~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     gdpgpsa |  -.0558652   .0173836    -3.21   0.002    -.0906035   -.0211269 
 gdpgpsalag1 |  -.0461674   .0188242    -2.45   0.017    -.0837846   -.0085502 
unemployme~1 |  -.4483932   .1094934    -4.10   0.000    -.6671983    -.229588 
unemployme~2 |   -.099769   .1063323    -0.94   0.352    -.3122572    .1127191 
unemployme~3 |  -.4232828   .0978384    -4.33   0.000    -.6187972   -.2277684 
       _cons |   .0796797   .0176264     4.52   0.000     .0444561    .1149033 
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reg  e2 gdpgpsa gdpgpsalag1 unemploymentlag1 unemploymentlag2 unemploymentlag3 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      69 
-------------+------------------------------           F(  5,    63) =    0.85 
       Model |  .000198542     5  .000039708           Prob > F      =  0.5190 
    Residual |  .002939731    63  .000046662           R-squared     =  0.0633 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared = -0.0111 
       Total |  .003138274    68  .000046151           Root MSE      =  .00683 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
          e2 |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
     gdpgpsa |  -.0000646   .0016848    -0.04   0.970    -.0034315    .0033022 
 gdpgpsalag1 |  -.0026291   .0018244    -1.44   0.155     -.006275    .0010167 
unemployme~1 |   .0005702   .0106121     0.05   0.957    -.0206365    .0217768 
unemployme~2 |  -.0004025   .0103057    -0.04   0.969    -.0209969    .0201919 
unemployme~3 |  -.0122584   .0094825    -1.29   0.201    -.0312077    .0066909 
       _cons |   .0065405   .0017084     3.83   0.000     .0031266    .0099543 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
The    distribution with 68 degrees of freedom is: 
  = ×  =                 
The 5% critical value is approximately 95. Thus, we conclude that 
heteroskedasticity is not present. 
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Regression Results, Table 2, Japan 
reg changeinunemployment recession  gdpgpsa dyDUM gdpgpsalag1 dyDUMLag1 
unemploymentlag1 duDUMLag1 unemploymentlag2 duDUMLag2 unemploymentlag3 duDUMLag3 in 
1/72 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      71 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    59) =    1.58 
       Model |  .049169344    11   .00446994           Prob > F      =  0.1294 
    Residual |  .167167144    59  .002833341           R-squared     =  0.2273 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.0832 
       Total |  .216336488    70  .003090521           Root MSE      =  .05323 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
changeinun~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   recession |   .0100927   .0711052     0.14   0.888    -.1321885     .152374 
     gdpgpsa |   .0012311   .0104218     0.12   0.906    -.0196228     .022085 
       dyDUM |  -.0413406   .0557717    -0.74   0.461    -.1529395    .0702583 
 gdpgpsalag1 |  -.0172738   .0096435    -1.79   0.078    -.0365703    .0020228 
   dyDUMLag1 |   -.018952   .0236434    -0.80   0.426    -.0662623    .0283584 
unemployme~1 |  -.2379139   .1254864    -1.90   0.063    -.4890116    .0131838 
   duDUMLag1 |   .0975071   .5931212     0.16   0.870    -1.089326     1.28434 
unemployme~2 |  -.0723095   .1239875    -0.58   0.562    -.3204079     .175789 
   duDUMLag2 |  -.9030197     .51942    -1.74   0.087    -1.942377    .1363374 
unemployme~3 |  -.0690334   .1241646    -0.56   0.580    -.3174862    .1794194 
   duDUMLag3 |   .0381093   .4775186     0.08   0.937    -.9174032    .9936219 
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       _cons |     .01407   .0106246     1.32   0.191    -.0071898    .0353298 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Regression Results, Table 2, Germany 
reg  changeinunemployment recession gdpgpsa dyDUM gdpgpsalag1 dyDUMLag1 
unemploymentlag1 duDUMLag1 unemploymentlag2 duDUMLag2 unemploymentlag3 duDUMLag3 in 
1/72 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      66 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 11,    54) =    2.44 
       Model |  .130887116    11  .011898829           Prob > F      =  0.0150 
    Residual |  .263482752    54   .00487931           R-squared     =  0.3319 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.1958 
       Total |  .394369868    65  .006067229           Root MSE      =  .06985 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
changeinun~t |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   recession |   .1549986   .1526157     1.02   0.314    -.1509774    .4609745 
     gdpgpsa |   -.012925   .0157609    -0.82   0.416    -.0445238    .0186738 
       dyDUM |   .2248848   .3178313     0.71   0.482    -.4123285    .8620981 
 gdpgpsalag1 |  -.0167758   .0163477    -1.03   0.309    -.0495511    .0159994 
   dyDUMLag1 |   .1481421   .1489639     0.99   0.324    -.1505126    .4467968 
unemployme~1 |  -.2905251   .1339816    -2.17   0.035     -.559142   -.0219082 
   duDUMLag1 |  -.1574238     .41789    -0.38   0.708    -.9952429    .6803953 
unemployme~2 |  -.0576923    .129017    -0.45   0.657    -.3163558    .2009713 
   duDUMLag2 |  -.0889439    .424862    -0.21   0.835     -.940741    .7628532 
unemployme~3 |  -.3196363   .1245276    -2.57   0.013    -.5692992   -.0699735 
   duDUMLag3 |   -1.68376   1.487807    -1.13   0.263    -4.666634    1.299114 
71 
 
       _cons |   .0236817   .0139592     1.70   0.096    -.0043048    .0516682 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
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Regression Results, Table 2, the United States 
reg percentageunemploymentchange recession gdpgpsa dyDUM gdpgpsalag1 dyDUMLag1 
unemploymentlag1 duDUMLag1 unemploymentlag2 duDUMLag2 unemploymentlag3 duDUMLag3 in 
1/72 
note: duDUMLag1 omitted because of collinearity 
 
      Source |       SS       df       MS              Number of obs =      69 
-------------+------------------------------           F( 10,    58) =    7.66 
       Model |  .385800441    10  .038580044           Prob > F      =  0.0000 
    Residual |  .291949445    58  .005033611           R-squared     =  0.5692 
-------------+------------------------------           Adj R-squared =  0.4950 
       Total |  .677749886    68   .00996691           Root MSE      =  .07095 
 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
p~unemploy~e |      Coef.   Std. Err.      t    P>|t|     [95% Conf. Interval] 
-------------+---------------------------------------------------------------- 
   recession |    .034913   .0445015     0.78   0.436    -.0541665    .1239924 
     gdpgpsa |  -.0417858   .0207792    -2.01   0.049    -.0833799   -.0001917 
       dyDUM |  -.0573859   .0704434    -0.81   0.419    -.1983936    .0836219 
 gdpgpsalag1 |  -.0361842   .0204017    -1.77   0.081    -.0770225    .0046542 
   dyDUMLag1 |  -.0121153   .0647906    -0.19   0.852    -.1418077     .117577 
unemployme~1 |  -.4358789   .1135116    -3.84   0.000     -.663097   -.2086608 
   duDUMLag1 |  (omitted) 
unemployme~2 |  -.0953168   .1118707    -0.85   0.398    -.3192504    .1286168 
   duDUMLag2 |  -.2379477   .4162641    -0.57   0.570    -1.071191    .5952954 
unemployme~3 |  -.3822687   .1015974    -3.76   0.000     -.585638   -.1788993 
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   duDUMLag3 |  -.6950326   .4918653    -1.41   0.163    -1.679608    .2895427 
       _cons |   .0576761   .0231667     2.49   0.016      .011303    .1040492 
------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 
